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Introduction 
 
The attacks in Paris took 129 lives and left over 352 victims hospitalised. Victims were 
mainly young people of 15 nationalities from around the world. Casualties would have been 
even higher if the three suicide bombers who blew themselves up at the Stade de France had 
succeeded in their goal of entering the stadium itself. The insurgency devastated families, 
friendships, workplaces and communities. Initial investigations point to the terrorist group 
being an international complement with planning and coordination taking place in Belgium 
and France. The French Government responded by imposing a state of emergency, closing 
borders and launching bombing raids on the ISIL-held Syrian city of Raqqa. Worldwide 
condemnation has mixed with symbolic global solidarity as iconic landmarks across the 
world were illuminated in the French national colours.  
  
 
 
 Shanghai shows solidarity:  
Pudong Tower illuminated in colours of the French Tricolour  
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Analysis 
 
A number of key points arise in assessing these attacks: 
 
• These attacks are different from the Paris attacks of 7 January, targeting the satirical 
magazine Charlie Hebdo and Paris’ Jewish community. The attacks at the beginning 
of the year were, at least in the case of the magazine, highly specific and designed to 
right a particular wrong. The latest attacks are, quite clearly, more extensive, 
sophisticated in their planning and logistics and display a disturbingly higher level of 
organisational and technical capability. 
 
• Unlike the January attacks, these have been carefully crafted, coordinated and 
choreographed to strike at “soft”, i.e. civilian targets; calibrated to evoke as 
widespread and intense a sense of fear and revulsion among as broad an audience as 
possible. This is ‘terrorism’ in its most classic sense – the inculcation of ‘terror’ in the 
immediate vicinity of the act itself, but more importantly to the perpetrators, in the 
wider viewing audience. With near instantaneous communication through social 
media platforms, mobile footage goes ‘viral’ quickly, thereby facilitating the 
transmission of the terrorist perpetrator’s “message” to a global audience almost 
immediately.  
 
• The targets selected, ranging from chic bars, concert venue and the bars around the 
Stade de France, were aimed at Paris’s cultural and entertainment heart. The 
motivation here is three-fold.  
 
o Firstly, these were selected as high-visibility, high impact targets – sending the 
message that the general public are not safe anywhere, at any time from terror. 
This was intended to be a delivery of a “message” in the starkest, brutal 
fashion possible.  
 
o Secondly, this is an attack on French and European cultural life and the 
degenerate, materialistic values they are viewed as embodying. This was not 
the primary motivation, multiple eyewitness testimonies from cross the target 
venues, cross-verify attacker reference to Syria. Nevertheless, the choice of 
  
target is telling, with an evident common strand grounded in the clash of 
cultures. 
 
o Thirdly, as with the Sharm-el-Sheik airliner attack, the attacks are intended to 
strike at, the culture and entertainment industries, important components of the 
Parisian and French economies. The French economy is Europe’s third-largest 
economy and tourism is a major contributor; France is the most visited 
destination in the world and maintains the third largest income in the world 
from tourism. 
 
• The aftermath of such attacks, unsurprisingly, lean many to ask if they could not have 
been avoided, i.e. that the success of the attacks is the result of a catastrophic failure 
of France’s security intelligence community. Intelligence-gathering is far from an 
exact science. Advanced technology helps, most particularly with communications 
intercepts and monitoring, but good quality intelligence must still rely on human 
intelligence (HUMINT). Successfully infiltrating terrorist organisations has never 
been easy, but given their disaggregated recruitment and operational cell structures, is 
particularly problematic with regard to al-Qaeda or IS (Islamic State). As a result, 
counter-terrorism relies on a combination of communications intercept technology, 
but vitally, on access to credible information from HUMINT. Building the networks, 
acquiring critical human assets, monitoring, sifting and assessing is complex and 
challenging. A significant number of French citizens have gone to both Syria and Iraq 
to fight with ISIL in recent years with around 200 or so returning to France. The 
surveillance resources required for such numbers outstrip existing capacity. As an 
officer with French intelligence told the New York Times in the wake of the Charlie 
Hebdo attacks in January 2015, "we would need to triple our staff to better protect 
[Paris]". 
 
• The scale of the attacks do, however, raise significant concerns about the level and 
quality of intelligence-gathering capacity-the operational organisational structure, 
human resources and financing of France’s security service and of coordination, 
communication and intelligence-sharing with other security services. 
 
• Are these attacks indicative of a wider ISIL strategy to target other major cities or are 
they France-specific? The answer is that they are indicative of both. The attacks had a 
very particular aim of striking at France, for its Syrian engagement. But such attacks 
also form part of an ISIL strategy and European security services, including that of 
the UK, have successfully foiled a number of planned attacks in recent years. David 
Cameron, speaking at a press conference at the G20 in Turkey in the aftermath of the 
attacks, confirmed that the UK had foiled seven planned attacks on the UK in recent 
menthes, including one in  the preceding month. This reiterated a statement made in 
late October by the Director-General of MI5, Andrew Parker, that the UK had 
prevented six planned attacks in the past year (The Telegraph, 16 November, 2015; 
telegraph.co.uk). 
 
 
 
Policy implications 
 
  
There are three areas of policy that need to be considered: resources; 
coordination, and international cooperation These arise at three levels: France 
itself; regionally, at the EU and pan-European level and globally. Reviews by 
the French Government and by the National Assembly will, of course, seek to 
assess and identify any organisational weaknesses that allowed the attacks to 
take place. Questions will be raised about information-gathering and sharing, 
evaluation and operational response systems.  The French leader has announced 
the creation of 8,500 extra jobs  in the police, judicial and border control 
services. Already, in the wake of the attacks a series of discussions and new 
measures were agreed at the G20 Summit. French President Hollande, unable to 
attend the G20 due to the emergency, is travelling to Washington for talks with 
President Obama and to Moscow with president Putin.  
   At the EU level, France is now seeking a complete suspension of the 
Schengen Agreement, the treaty which removed systematic border controls 
between many of the EU member countries. Under Schengen provisions, 
suspension is permitted in emergency crises. If agreed, this would amount to a 
major potential policy shift. Schengen has, hitherto, been regarded by 
proponents as a sine quo non, an essential component and icon of the European 
project and closer integration of European economies and societies. Closing 
external borders to the EU may carry short-term political gains for some 
European leaders. However, the reality is that no matter how far ‘Europe’ 
travels down the path towards ‘Fortress Europe’, the harsh practical reality is 
that Europe’s border controls are a patchwork quilt of efficiency and 
effectiveness. Strengthened border surveillance and monitoring can, of course 
disrupt and dislocated potential attackers. But those committed to terrorist acts 
are unlikely to be seriously deterred or significantly inconvenienced logistically 
for long.  
   Increased capacity-building for surveillance is necessary, and European 
government’s are responding to the Paris attacks with announcements of 
increased budgetary and human resources, but for a pan-European response to 
be effective, requires Europe-wide commitment to an equal degree and national 
ability to implement.  
   This may be harder to achieve in practice. There needs to be a closer 
coordination, and a more solid European political and material commitment to 
the relationship with organisations such as the Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The OSCE has an extensive engagement with 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe and has provided important post-Cold 
War facilitation support for transition societies, but more recently has gradually 
drifted into something of a Cinderella organisation and its resources, experience 
and institutional architecture could be utilised to a much greater degree. More 
widely, policy concerns also arise with regard to NATO. At the time of writing, 
the NATO Treaty provision that ‘an attack on one, is an attack on all’, phrasing 
used by President Hollande following the attacks, has not been formally 
  
activated, unlike the ‘9/11’ attacks. In practice, however, this has already been 
taken as read by NATO members. Within this context, a further examination of 
existing information-gathering and sharing structures and processes in the light 
of the Paris attacks is necessary.  
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